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Abstract
Spam and other electronic abuses have long been a focus of computer security research. However, recent work
in the domain has emphasized an economic analysis of these operations in the hope of understanding and
disrupting the profit model of attackers. Such studies do not lend themselves to passive measurement
techniques. Instead, researchers have become middle-men or active participants in spam behaviors;
methodologies that lie at an interesting juncture of legal, ethical, and human subject e.g., IRB) guidelines. In
this work two such experiments serve as case studies: One testing a novel link spam model on Wikipedia and
another using blackhat software to target blog comments and forums.
Discussion concentrates on the experimental design process, especially as in uenced by human-subject policy.
Case studies are used to frame related work in the area, and scrutiny reveals the computer science community
requires greater consistency in evaluating research of this nature.
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Abstract. Spam and other electronic abuses have long been a focus
of computer security research. However, recent work in the domain has
emphasized an economic analysis of these operations in the hope of un-
derstanding and disrupting the profit model of attackers. Such studies
do not lend themselves to passive measurement techniques. Instead, re-
searchers have become middle-men or active participants in spam behav-
iors; methodologies that lie at an interesting juncture of legal, ethical,
and human subject (e.g., IRB) guidelines.
In this work two such experiments serve as case studies: One test-
ing a novel link spam model on Wikipedia and another using blackhat
software to target blog comments and forums. Discussion concentrates
on the experimental design process, especially as influenced by human-
subject policy. Case studies are used to frame related work in the area,
and scrutiny reveals the computer science community requires greater
consistency in evaluating research of this nature.
1 Introduction
Spam needs little introduction given estimates that 95%+ of email traffic, 75%
of all blog comments, and nearly every medium of human communication has
been pervaded by the practice. The growing prevalence of distributed and collab-
orative models of information dissemination (i.e., Web 2.0 forums, wikis, blogs,
etc.) has only expanded the battleground. Measurement studies from the end-
user perspective have long been the predominant method of examining these
phenomena. More recently research has begun to consider the attacker’s per-
spective: What are the motivations? How much money is made? What are the
greatest marginal costs? By answering these questions researchers can hope to
better understand the spam profit model and how to undermine it.
However, an empirical view of these notions does not come cheaply. The
first-person viewpoints that enable such studies raise interesting legal, ethical,
and human subject questions. Although formal bodies (e.g., Institutional Re-
view Boards, “IRBs”) exist to regulate these matters it appears the computer
science community is unfamiliar, or questioning of, their role. As two case stud-
ies reveal this yields unfair and inconsistent academic evaluations that satisfy
neither authors, reviewers, or program committees (PCs).
This work begins by describing two recent works in this domain (Sec. 2), both
actively conducting spamming campaigns with scientific interests. One targeted
a collaborative platform (Wikipedia) and the other blog/forum environments.
These case studies were subject to institutional review and their approval process
is described at length (Sec. 3). This description: (1) sketches the approval process
and policies that regulate this kind of research, and (2) outlines the experimental
methodologies that brought these studies into compliance.
After the experiments were completed/described, the papers proceeded into
the publication process. What followed exemplifies the inability of the commu-
nity to soundly evaluate research of this kind (Sec. 4). Reactions ranged from
applause to outrage; some endorsing IRB approval and others rejecting it en-
tirely. It is unclear if the community is: (1) unfamiliar with the scope/role of
the current review process, or (2) informed but dissatisfied with its judgments.
Regardless, authors deserve a system by which research can be approved and
evaluated under the same criteria. Similarly, reviewers are entitled to one that
allows them to judge submissions on technical merit and not personal beliefs.
This work continues by surveying literature about the evolving role of ethics,
IRBs, and researchers in technical studies – and framing other active measure-
ment work in this context (Sec. 5). Finally, concluding remarks are made (Sec. 6).
It should be emphasized that this work is a case study exemplifying ethical
disagreement/issues. While it advocates the need for improvement, it does not
endorse any particular mechanism for achieving it. While this remains an open
issue for the computer science community, we believe it important to realize that
the IRB is the only such regulator in the status quo.
2 Case Study Research
In this section we describe our case studies, two active measurement Web 2.0
link spam experiments which serve as the basis for later discussion. Included here
is information about how these studies were conducted, the statistics collected,
and the conclusions yielded by analyzing that data.
At a high level the experiments are quite similar with both economic compo-
nents following the “pipeline” model described by Kanich et al. [13]. Summarily,
after the spam hyperlinks have been disseminated there are three important
measurements. First is the number of exposures, the quantity of individuals who
view the spam link. Second is the click-through rate, the percentage of exposures
that result in a visit to the landing site (i.e., the webpage at the spam URL,
or at the conclusion of that URL’s redirection chain). Finally, the ratio of site
visitors that actually make a purchase is termed the conversion rate.
Both case studies implemented a “payment disabled” store front (as per [13])
in order to collect the latter two statistics. These landing sites operate much like
any online store but attempts to “check out” result in a technical failure or other
Fig. 1. Example landing site Fig. 2. Prominent link display in a wiki
complication. In this manner, one can approximate purchase quantity and value
without having to fulfill transactions. Both case studies constructed/scraped
landing sites that were pharmaceutical in nature (see Fig. 1).
The two experiments3 differ most in the environments being studied. The
first, conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, performed proof-of-concept
attacks to show the economic viability of a novel spam model against the collab-
orative encyclopedia, Wikipedia (Sec. 2.1). The second, via Curtin University,
used blackhat software to target web forums and blog comments (Sec. 2.2).
2.1 UPenn Research: Wikipedia Spam
Collaborative functionality is becoming increasingly prevalent in web applica-
tions and no paradigm embodies this more purely than the wiki. The open-
editing permissions and massive traffic4 of some wiki installations (e.g., English
Wikipedia) would seem to invite spam behaviors. To the surprise of its authors,
a measurement study [25] found status quo spam behaviors to be technically
na¨ıve, comparatively infrequent, and ineffective for their perpetrators.
Using their expertise of collaborative security the researchers next sought to
identify vulnerabilities of the platform. In doing so they described a novel attack
model that exploits the latency of Wikipedia’s human-driven enforcement [25].
In this model link placement is characterized by: (1) targeting high traffic pages,
(2) prominent link styling (see Fig. 2), and (3) the use of privileged accounts.
To show the viability of the attack model an active measurement study
was engineered. The experiments added links to a payment-disabled pharmacy
per the proposed strategy. Only seeking to establish a proof-of-concept, just 3
Wikipedia accounts were used. These accounts posted 341 hyperlinks with each
surviving for an average of 93 seconds. Public article view statistics show that
≈14,000 individuals were exposed to the link, generating 6,307 click-throughs
(i.e., landing site visits) that led to 8 “purchases” for $1940 USD.
The “revenue” generated considerably exceeded the marginal attack costs,
suggesting a viable attack model (at least initially). Despite IRB approval, these
3 The authors of this paper are a subset of those conducting the case study research.
4 Distributed attacks that target low traffic and poorly maintained wikis for search-
engine-optimization (SEO) are not uncommon. The research under discussion, how-
ever, concentrates only on direct traffic (i.e., click-throughs) in high exposure wikis.
results remain unpublished for reasons discussed in Sec. 4. However, this result
did motivate additional research into protections against such vulnerabilities,
the suggestions of which have been actively described and implemented [24].
2.2 Curtin Research: Blog/Forum Spam
Relative to the novel proposal on Wikipedia, link spam in blog comments and
forums is a pervasive issue. One source estimates that 75%+ of blog comments
are spam [4]. This proliferation suggests the status quo attack model is profitable
to its perpetrators, motivating research into its economic dynamics. We choose
to highlight [10, 11], which actively posted links to these environments.
Work began by harvesting sites running common software (e.g., phpBB,
Wordpress) with circumvent-able protections (e.g., CPU-solvable CAPTCHAs,
no registration, etc.). In this manner the common structure and weaknesses can
enable autonomous link placement at minimal marginal cost. Such functional-
ity has been encoded into blackhat software and the experiment used one such
tool: XRumer [3, 21]. In addition to posting links the researchers also spoofed
the “referrer URL” of the HTTP headers to point to the pharmacy site5.
The harvesting stage produced a list of ≈98,000 websites of which 66,226
were practically targeted after discounting network errors. From these, 7,772
links (11.7%) were successfully posted to public view, with the remainder being
caught by spam filters, manual moderation, etc. The month-long experiment
produced 2,059 pharmacy visits and 3 “intents to purchase.” Minor modifications
in link placement strategy also permitted more fine-grained observations. For
example, non-English websites produced higher response rates, and referrer spam
produced more landing site hits than the actual link placements.
As of this writing the recent research remains unpublished. However, it is the
authors’ intention for the work to appear as [10].
3 Obtaining Research Approval
Our case studies now summarized, we next describe their formal approval pro-
cess. More than rote description, this discussion intends to use the approval
criteria as an outline for focusing on experimental design and ethical issues. We
begin by justifying the need for active measurement (Sec. 3.1). Having decided to
use human subjects, we next describe the approval workflow (Sec. 3.2). Then, we
handle the talking points of approval: informed consent (Sec. 3.3), maintenance
of privacy (Sec. 3.4), and minimization/justification of harm (Sec. 3.5).
3.1 Infeasibility of Passive Measurement
Before engaging in active measurement it should be the case that a passive
approach is not feasible. A leading study of email spam economics [13] creatively
5 This is a technique called “referrer spam”, “log spam”, or “referrer bombing.” Sites
that make access logs public will have the spam URLs indexed by search engines.
became a “man-in-the-middle” to a botnet operation and rewrote spam URLs
to a payment-disabled pharmacy under their own control. In this manner, no
additional spam was sent and the spam they rewrote was less malicious than it
would have been otherwise. A similar strategy is difficult to imagine in Web 2.0
environments where attacks are coordinated by software empowered individuals.
Recruitment of cooperative blog/forum owners for research purposes deserves
consideration. No additional spam would need to be injected as status quo events
could be examined. Visitor logs would quantify exposure and outgoing link clicks
could be tracked. However, this presents issues: (1) participating owners are
unlikely to form a representative set (poorly maintained sites are likely crucial
for attackers), and (2) this result says nothing about conversion rates.
The Wikipedia study has additional complications. Given a single intended
target (English Wikipedia), a rejected request for cooperation would raise admin-
istrative awareness and bias any subsequent (non-consenting) trials. Moreover,
because the strategy is a novel one it is impossible to glean statistics without
injecting links per the proposed model.
3.2 Approval Workflow
Having decided to undertake active measurement, formal approvals must be ob-
tained from organizations overseeing: (1) human-subjects/ethics and (2) legality.
Human-subjects/ethics: Any experiment involving data collection from hu-
mans is required to undergo review. Internationally these groups go by different
names but are quite similar in function; the U.S. has the Institutional Review
Board (IRB), Australia prefers Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC),
and the European Union uses Research Ethics Committees (RECs).
There is ongoing debate over whether human subjects approval is equivalent
to an experiment being ethical or whether it is only a component thereof. We
challenge readers to imagine any form of ethically interesting research that does
not at least indirectly impact humans (or animals) in some way (physically,
psychologically, economically, etc.). Regardless, some in the computer science
community do draw this distinction leading to inconsistency in the evaluation of
research (see Sec. 4). Further examination of this controversial issue is beyond
the scope of this work, as we prefer to focus on experience-driven analysis.
In the blog/forum case study (Curtin University, AUS), the process began
by contacting a department-level ethics coordinator. This individual determined
the experiment to be “low risk” and eligible for an expedited review. Per Uni-
versity/AUS policy [1] low risk research is that which “does not pose a greater
risk than participants would face in their normal daily routine.” Supporting this
criterion are the facts that: (1) advertisements and spam are already ubiqui-
tous in blog/forum environments, and (2) statistical collection on the web is
omnipresent. After one meeting the study was allowed to continue.
Matters were more complex for the Wikipedia case study (UPenn, USA).
After an IRB coordinator found that the research posed “more than minimal
risk to subjects” [2] a request for expedited approval was rejected in favor of a
full board review. Seemingly, the concern was that publication of the novel attack
model could considerably endanger Wikipedia’s operation if the vulnerabilities
remained unpatched (see Sec. 3.3). After multiple iterations of clarification and
research gathering the protocol was approved in ≈14 weeks time6.
This “full board review” produced a number of observations which may be in-
teresting to readers. First, the board proceedings are non-transparent and closed-
door (except for clarifications), doing little to inform other researchers how to
best shape their experiments to the satisfaction of the IRB/HREC/etc. Further,
the latency and lack of technical expertise among members have previously been
identified as weaknesses of the process [6, 9].
Legal Approval: The legal approval process was less structured. The Wikipedia
study did come to the attention of the University’s Office of the General Counsel,
who did not object to publication of the study results with IRB approval. The
blog/forum research was not required to seek such approval by their coordinator.
The legal framework in which this research operates is beyond the scope of this
work (see [7]), though it is interesting to consider how differing jurisdictions may
affect what is deemed “acceptable” research.
3.3 Regarding Participant Consent
A majority of human subjects studies operate under informed consent, whereby
a potential subject is informed a priori of the purpose and potential risks of
participation. If he/she voluntarily decides to proceed, this removes considerable
responsibility from the researcher. It is possible to forego informed consent where
it is: (1) technically impractical and/or (2) biasing of results. However, this
places stricter requirements on the experimental methodology. Both case studies
operated without the prior consent of any participant.
As discussed in Sec. 3.1, contacting site administrators would create recruit-
ment bias and/or raise administrative awareness. In the case of readers, informed
consent also produces numerous issues. Consider that experiments take place on
a 3rd-party site where: (1) the consent dialogue alone might constitute spam,
and (2) limited control would force that dialogue to be awkwardly adjacent to
the behavior being measured. Further, those who choose to ignore the spam
messages (the vast majority of exposures) incur minimal disruption. One might
imagine that forcing everyone to opt-in/out of the experiments would create
more annoyance than the experiments themselves.
Following these arguments, both case studies were approved to proceed with-
out informed consent. Having chosen this course, the anonymity of the expo-
sures/readers becomes paramount (Sec. 3.4). This does not eliminate the pos-
6 Experiment design was influenced by the ethical norms of the IRB process. However,
it should be acknowledged that approval was received in an ex post facto fashion,
due in part to an initial miscommunication with the IRB. Such ex post facto scrutiny
follows the same workflow and is held to the same standard as a priori review. This
occurrence speaks to the unfamiliarity and poor working relationship others have
reported between computer scientists and these boards (see Secs. 4 and 5).
sibility of debriefing test subjects after their participation. Readers could po-
tentially be notified as they exit the experiment pipeline (navigating off-site;
attempting to purchase) but such information could influence how others inter-
act with the experiment. For example, in a wiki setting, a reader who discovers
the “spam” to be an academic experiment may not give it treatment consistent
with spam links (i.e., removal). Notification en masse after the entire experiment
duration is not possible given the decision to preserve anonymity.
In the case studies, one instance of debriefing was present. The adminis-
trative community of Wikipedia (the Wikimedia Foundation) was contacted
post-experiment. In this email notification the vulnerabilities were described
and technical assistance was offered towards mitigating the exploit.
3.4 Privacy and Data Security
Given that we have collected the behavior of non-consenting users, there is a re-
sponsibility to protect that data: its release could lead to embarrassment or other
harm. One way to prevent this is by severing the mapping between experiment
events and real persons (i.e., an anonymous experiment).
In the Wikipedia experiment under the IRB system, information capable
of identifying real persons is called personally identifiable information (PII).
The IRB required that data collected by the checkout system be immediately
destroyed (it never left the client machines) with the exception of the items being
purchased and their value. To uniquely identify click-through and purchasing
users, a hash of the IP address was stored7. The IP addresses themselves were
considered PII due to static IPs, the possibility of geo-location, etc.
The Australian notion of privacy had a very different interpretation. In the
blog/forum case study server logs were maintained and authors geo-located their
landing site visitors. In their setup, registration was required to checkout, with
relevant fields including: (1) first name, (2) last name, and (3) email address.
These fields were manually inspected to ensure the registration attempts were
legitimate, before the data was destroyed. The Australian body seems to operate
on the logic that “since normal spam sites would view registration data, it is
permissible for the researchers to do so.”
Just as participant data must be secured there is a need to protect the iden-
tities of the researchers and their institutions mid-experiment. Thus, we discuss
the computing framework in which these studies operated. Consider that it is
desirable to use non-institutional IP addresses to launch the experiments and
host the landing site. This avoids experimental bias (e.g., *.edu sites might not
trip filters) and protects the institution from ill consequences (e.g., blacklisting).
One case study launched experiments from a large cloud provider and hosted
their landing site via a 3rd party service (whose data retention was vetted). The
other study purchased a dedicated Internet connection (outside the University
network) for hosting and used proxy servers and VPN for outbound traffic.
7 As one reviewer pointed out, the finite nature of IP space makes it feasible to reverse
these (now destroyed) hashes – a consideration not foreseen in experiment design.
3.5 Minimizing and Justifying Harm
Harm in any experiment should be both minimized and justified. We now extend
previous discussion about risk minimization to include experiment elements that
were not major “talking points” of the approvals process.
Experiment Scale: Rather than assessing risk at the per-subject level, a more
pragmatic approach is to consider the cumulative cost to all participants, making
the scale of experiments a significant factor. The blog/forum case study was
approved without any conditions on the size of the experiments (though ethical
approval is valid for 12 months, after which re-evaluation is required). In those
experiments 66,000 sites were targeted, a scope seemingly justified by the large
number of sub-experiments and need for statistically significant data. Consider
that while the number of targets/exposures is large, relatively few engage in the
interesting behaviors (click-through, conversion) being measured.
Generally one should carefully weigh the need for statistical significance
against human costs. Showing the viability of novel theories should require less
iterations than measurement studies (although the Wikipedia study produced
14,000+ exposures in just 3 trials). Also consider that long running or narrowly
focused experiments could target the same individual(s) multiple times.
Deceptive Advertising: Ethical review boards tend to be sensitive to deception
of test subjects. At the same time, attackers are by their very nature deceptive
agents and accurate simulations need to reflect this nature. In the case studies
one potential source of deception is hyperlink presentation, i.e., the hooks or
description that is associated with links. Among several strategies it was the
alluring and deceptive hooks (e.g., “click to collect your prize”) which proved
most controversial. However, hooks of this type far outperformed more mundane
approaches, speaking to the effectiveness of such social engineering tactics.
Others might question the choice of landing site genre. One case study sold
a wide range of pharmaceuticals while the other focused only on the “male
enhancement” subset. A previous study [14] showed it is precisely these products
which dominate online spam revenue. Moreover, care was taken to make sure the
sites were free of any harmful/suggestive imagery and descriptions.
Just because harm is minimized (while maintaining experiment integrity) does
not mean it is justified. For that to be true, experiments must produce a net
benefit which exceeds any harm (a consequentialist approach [8]). This is a par-
ticularly unsatisfying condition given that the outcomes of the research cannot
be known a priori. Nonetheless, in the case studies the: (1) novelty of the work,
(2) daily exposure of readers/administrators to spam behaviors, and (3) pro-
jected understanding of the spam ecosystem indicated a foreseeable benefit.
Project benefit can be more accurately assessed in an ex post facto fashion.
Wikipedia active measurement showed the attack model viable, motivating the
authors to create a spam detection engine for wikis [24]. A live implementation
of the technique has already assisted in the removal of far more spam instances
than placed during active measurement. Moreover, circumstances arising during
the experiment encouraged further study into “redacted revisions” [26].
4 Community Response and Discussion
Once case study research was completed the logical next step was to submit
the findings to academic journals and conferences. The inconsistent treatment
of ethical issues in reviewer feedback was not expected. More importantly, it
raises questions about how the community and publication process can better
accommodate research of this kind.
Reviewer Response: The response to Wikipedia active measurement was ex-
tremely mixed8 (all submissions noted the IRB approval). Some reviewers ap-
plauded the study, finding the methodology appropriate and necessary proof of
an earlier hypothesis. Others took a more neutral approach, pointing to possible
ethical implications but stating that the IRB approval was evidence of reasonable
conduct. Others still assaulted the methodology, questioned the social conscience
of the authors, and were prepared to reject the paper on ethical grounds alone.
Excerpts from some of the critical responses are in Appendix A.
Several iterations of submission followed. In one attempt, several pages were
dedicated to ethical justifications (pages that could have been dedicated to tech-
nical content). In the end, it was decided to omit the active measurement results
from the paper due to these complications and concerns over statistical signif-
icance/stability. In the published version [25] there is only a numerical estima-
tion of attack viability. Though only just beginning the publication process the
blog/forum study is experiencing similar reactions.
Discussion: A major issue is why some reviewers are not satisfied with ethical
review decisions and make it their own responsibility to regulate the matter. An
IRB is best-equipped to make these decisions, being armed with experience and
precedent, and having seen supporting documents to which reviewers are not
privy9. This may be partially explainable by the unfamiliarity many computer
scientists have of these organizations, as described by Garfinkel [9].
One such example can be seen in [5] where the author suggests IRBs are
insufficient and bases this on a flawed argument. He cites two experiments that
“do not involve human subjects. . .”: (1) an experiment that congested residen-
tial Internet networks to learn about their characteristics and (2) a study that
de-anonymized packet traces, linking them to physical addresses. We believe
strongly these are human subjects issues that fall under IRB/committee juris-
diction. The first example would affect Internet QoS for users and the second
has obvious privacy implications.
We acknowledge that the IRB (and its equivalents) may be a logistically
imperfect system (see [9]). However, in the absence of an alternative, this is no
8 It is difficult to quantify the weight these ethical disagreements had in accept/reject
decisions (although one reviewer did make the connection explicit, see Appendix A).
We prefer to focus solely on the qualitative feedback given about active measurement.
9 Submitted versions included a footnote indicating that reviewers/PC-members could
be contacted to obtain a copy of the approval documents (e.g., via the conference
chair to preserve anonymity). No such requests were made.
reason not to respect its findings. Allowing PC chairs or reviewers to interject
their beliefs only lends greater subjectivity to evaluation. Consider that research
similar to the case studies has been published in spite of complaints and without
IRB approval (Sec. 5.1). Such a situation is unimaginable in many fields, where
IRB approval is considered a gold standard of approval (see again, Sec. 5.1).
For those who advocate a more responsive and technically-staffed IRB-like
organization it is clear it should come into force before research is conducted.
The current situation creates awkward situations where research has been per-
formed (along with any harm) but cannot be released to the community. Such
an organization also faces practical challenges in creating an objective and level
playing field. For example, how does one integrate the legal frameworks of inter-
national researchers? Will the organization supersede or operate alongside the
human subject boards (adding bureaucracy)? Who writes the policies?
Such an organization could be an asset to the community but is far from
being realized. Focusing on the status quo, human-subjects boards are the only
organizations properly equipped to handle these matters (and arguably, already
do so at the appropriate scope). This division-of-labor allows reviewers/PCs to
concentrate on their area of expertise: technical merit. Although imperfect, these
boards are the most satisfactory regulators of research ethics at this time. As
such, respect for their decisions is the greatest hope the community has for fairly
evaluating ethically interesting research.
5 Related Work
Discussion of related literature begins by looking at other spam and electronic
abuse research that has employed ethically notable active measurement tech-
niques (Sec. 5.1). Then, we look at writings about the formal review process and
issues specific to computer science research (Sec. 5.2).
5.1 Similar Abuse Research
As other active measurement studies are surveyed, we encourage readers to think
about experimental design and the potential risk posed. We divide our review
into: (1) studies that have engaged in spam-like behaviors, and (2) studies that
involve payment to spammers or spam-support services. To permit discussion our
literature selection is both non-exhaustive and narrow. Readers are encouraged
to see the survey of Moore and Anderson [18] for a broader look at ethically-
interesting security research, particularly of the empirical and behavioral variety.
Studies Conducting Abuse: The most similar work to the wiki case study
is [22] wherein the authors befriended 942 popular individuals on a social net-
working site. Then, they posted a “comment” including a 1×1 pixel image hot-
linked from their own server (the image(s) were sometimes 50+MB in size). In
their 12-day experiment their server recorded 2,598,692 hits, indicating the fea-
sibility of conducting DDOS attacks in this fashion. Though readers’ attention
was not particularly affected (their bandwidth was), administrator workload was
non-trivial. Communication with the authors revealed the work did not have IRB
approval and some reviewers raised complaints, yet the paper was still published.
Another work looked at the topic of “social phishing” [20]. There, the re-
searchers mined social network data in order to write personalized phishing
emails, sent to 600 university students. Relative to a control these customized
emails produced higher “success” rates (with 72% of students providing their
university credentials). This research had IRB/institutional approval as the pa-
per discusses at length, along with test-subject reactions to the work.
An interesting cross-domain perspective comes from [17] where the authors
posed as prospective students, emailing 6,600 university professors requesting a
meeting. Student names were chosen to imply gender/race, with the research
measuring the varying response rates. While not commercial spam, one could
imagine the cost per participant was quite high (reading the email, responding,
meeting scheduling/cancellation). This study had the IRB approval of multiple
institutions but drew considerable criticism in Internet communities. In an in-
teresting contrast to the case studies much condemnation was directed not at
the researchers, but the IRBs involved. Similarly, communication with an author
indicated no reviewer had raised ethical complaints.
Finally, [13] deserves mention for inspiring much research on active measure-
ment of electronic abuse. Therein the authors became a coordinating node in a
spam botnet. From this position they instruct worker nodes to send the same
spam emails they would have otherwise, but change the hyperlink URL to one
under their control (a payment-disabled pharmacy). However, because the study
“strictly reduced harm” (no new spam; made sent spam less malicious) it lies on
less tenuous ethical footing than the other work described herein.
Studies Aiding Abusers: Another frame of reference into spam economics can
be achieved by becoming a consumer of spam services. Just like one of the case
studies, [21] purchased blackhat spamming software (at $400+ USD) in order
to analyze its operation. Another work [19] spent hundreds of dollars to solve
100,000+ CAPTCHAs to study the dynamics of that underground economy. Fi-
nally, in [14, 15] researchers made 156 purchases from spam-advertised business
to make inferences about sale volume and examine financial routing. It is es-
pecially hard to quantify the harm that may be indirectly suffered as a result
of financially assisting these individuals/services. However, as evidenced by the
above papers, this seems to be a tactic generally well-received by the community.
5.2 IRB/Ethical Discussions
Numerous works have looked at legal, ethical, and human subjects issues in com-
puter science research. None is more relevant than [8], which lends a broader
perspective to the experiences shared herein. That work identified the weak-
nesses/limitations of the status quo to be: (1) an absence of shared community
values, (2) lack of familiarity with ethics and review systems, and (3) lack of
consensus on enforcement. They too looked at ways the community could move
forward, suggesting self-governance, public discussion, and protocols to reward
ethical behavior. Outside the scope of our writing, [8] also considers the roles of
professional societies (e.g., ACM, IEEE) and funding organizations.
Other writings have more narrow scope. Focusing on legal issues in particular
is [7], emphasizing the collection/sharing of network traces. The IRB has been
a point of emphasis, beginning with a look at how the Internet has changed its
role [23]. Other works [6, 9] criticize the IRBs latency and lack of technical ex-
pertise, with the latter claiming that much CS research runs afoul of regulation.
Moving beyond the IRB, [5] examines the program committees role in ethical
evaluation. Then, there are “best practices” papers like [16], focusing on “vul-
nerability research”. Finally, Kanich [12] writes similarly based on his extensive
experience with economic and cyber-crime research.
6 Conclusions
In this work, two case studies guided a discussion of the legal, ethical, and
human-subject considerations of active measurement research in spam and elec-
tronic abuse. Much discussion was dedicated to how experimental design was
shaped by the review process, bringing the controversial methodologies into pol-
icy compliance (of the IRB or its international equivalents). We intended this to
give some introduction into the role/operation of these review committees and
inspire readers to think about increasingly benign ways to gather data.
Paper rejections, negative reviews, and harsh personal criticism are not some-
thing many authors are eager to speak about. However, in relaying our own ex-
periences we hope to give exposure to an issue on which the computer science
community can improve: evaluating ethically interesting research. Critics con-
demn the IRBs latency, handling of technical matters, and scope. If this is indeed
a widely held view the review stage is a poor place to enforce it, and new bodies
need to be assembled to proactively regulate these matters. If no such consensus
exists (or until such a body is in place) then the community should respect the
current standard. Either way, the status quo is detrimental to authors, review-
ers, PCs, and the entire community – and the exposure and elimination of this
practical dilemma was our motivating interest in authoring this work.
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Appendix A: Reviewer Comments
Below is a sample of reviews received in response to the Wikipedia line of link spam
research. Effort has been made to preserve the context of the feedback. Each bullet
point represents the comments of a single reviewer.
– “The second measurement study is a bit offensive, but the IRB approval seems to
cover this . . . While the IRB problem is discussed, I am still not convinced that
such experiments with Wikipedia are good from an ethical point of view.”
– “I personally am concerned about the ethics of the active link-spamming research
. . . In particular, a natural guideline is that research should not cause harm or
damage to subjects without their informed consent. In this study, it appears that
harm or damage may have been done to Wikipedia by this research . . . and was
done without prior consent of the Wikipedia foundation . . . not persuaded that
the ‘consequentialist’ viewpoint is a suitable response to this concern.”
– “Although they did get their institution’s IRB to approve it, IRB approval is a
necessary, but not sufficient, step for justifying such an experiment . . . the exper-
iment imposed a substantial cost on the Wikipedia community, both the editors
who had to fix the page, and the thousands of users who encountered their spam.
Such a cost, which is involuntary to the participants, needs to be justified by a
significant gain in scientific understanding.”
– “. . . their active experiment is ethically deficient . . . I view each [of multiple is-
sues, the ‘ethical deficiency’ included] as a deal-breaker . . . The ethical standing
is dubious enough that it does *not* suffice to simply tell us that you had IRB
approval. We need to know the wording of what the IRB approved. In addition,
while the text briefly mentions (un)informed consent, there is no mention of *post
facto debriefing* . . . [this] makes the reviewer wonder to what degree the authors
really did obtain IRB approval that was itself informed.”
– “. . . the paper is rather offensive, it seems like Wikipedia actually received negative
press related to this experiment . . . I find this a bit questionable, the discussion
in the appendix is also not very convincing. Actually I had not thought that the
authors would receive IRC approval for this kind of study. I suggest to revise the
appendix and maybe even publish all IRC documents . . . Apart from this aspect,
the study is interesting and the authors demonstrate convincingly that Wikipedia
is an attractive target for link spam.”
